"TBE FUTURE ROLE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS"
by

Major General

J.

Strom 'Ihurmond, USAR

In ey comments today I shall cover several aspects of Civil Affairs
operations to i nclude some of th~ current developments.

I will discuss first

the future role of Civil Affairs in combat; mention briefly Civil Af:f'aJ.rs in
the cold war; in<U.ca.tfJ our interest in Civil ~:t'e.n se; ar.c., I 11ope, point out

to you that the military-civil relati onship t iuict ion

(i . e. , Civil Affairs) is

of such importance as to wa.rra..'lt proper reeognition on a co!'ml,9,nder' s staff e
First, let me remind you that the term. "Civil Affairs" shoul(l be '1<-~:f'im~d.

and understood to embrace the enti re range of rela.tions:ups betwe~n a military
force and the governmeµt administrative officials and tee general public of
:f'riewily and enemy areas affected. by the prese:a.ce and operations of.' s1.1ch forca.
It is indeed u."lfortu.TJ.ate that some people persist in the erro:c.eous belief that
Civ:T.1 .Ai'fairs is merely a st~ar.eoated term now used. to ic'ientify 'militar~·
goY<::..i....::. · ·:1:V ,

0

:tn other words only p:i:.•epa.rati on for the exercising of legislatiVe.,

judicial, and executive powers over an oceupied area after the war ha.a pasae~

on.
Whatever the mission of en armed force , t:1.e pro:pe:-c discli.arge of Civil
Mfairs operations in suwort thereof is usu.ally vital if the accomplishment of

t:!:J.a.t mission is to produce optinum benefi t to our national in'Gercsts0
The nature, seope, !f.'ao"'Tl.itude, and comple:dty cf Civil Mfa.irs re,:;.,uires

close General Sta.i'f coo:r.-dina:l;ion for :max5.mum res1.,,J:l;s.

Its importance in

compa.riso..-i to other aspects of en operation will va....ry within wide limits,
d~pending on the nature of the assie,r.ned mission and ·i:;h~ politicsl,· ~conomic, and
psychological condltions tt.'1.c1.ei· which this mission mt.mt be executed.

We.en we

consider these conditions, we realize that the occasion will be rare, indeed,

when Civil Affairs considerations may be completely igcored, even for a lindted
time, on the theory that they f'a.il to bear on the combs.t mission.

end of the speetrum there may be tiI!les when the whole

a Civil Affairs operation.

\!B,l!l:paign

Mi the; other

becomes virtually

'lh..1s was the case in Lebanon in 1958.

Doctrine,

training, staff' organization, force composition, opero;bions pl.a.."'l.s 1 anc.
operational prcceduxes must recognize these facts and be so sound, comprehensive

and flexible as i;o meet the requirements of aJJ.y of these situations in timely
fashion.

We must never forge·b that, other things beir.g eq_ual, timing becoml~G

t:.1.e essential factor in operational success.

And - til!ling c1_e!!J.a.."1ds not only

the presence of the nec!essary means but also fa.cili t_y: i:t the u~e of t !1ese mea.'Yls.
'.I.he key to proper evaluation, pla:nnin.3 a.'l.'.l.d e:icecut:i.on of Civ.l.1 /!f'fo.irs

operations lies in the l)or,j_tion and functions o:f' t:C.e Civil fii'i'a.irs element ot

the staff' with respect to ·the other elements o-J: the staf:l.

La.rg r tird.ts or

task forces anc. l.a.rge co1'llllB.ncls require a G-5 or co.«an.e~'lsm·a.te c.~::~eral Sta.f'f' type

entity in a joint or co.mbin~d headquarters.
has a coordina~dng function.

The Civil .Aftairr, staff e:l~rnero.t

Fo:r e..~w.1ple, it includes t2~ General Sta.ff

direction an& coord..ina.tion of sue~ activities as public ilrl'o:rwation and
p:,ychological opt;::ra.tions d.ir~ctea. at the civil gov~l'!.'1.:1.e;ut ano. po:I?ula.tia:n in i;~ ,~

ar,.a of opcrationso

Slria.11 te..ctica.1 ml.it staff's may not r~qt!ir~ a sp,-:l<:ia.lJ y

cl.ccigna.tea. C:f.v-ll Affairs ste.ff section, be cause th~ Col!llna:r.1der, with tc.l'.:! h.t::lp
of his JTocecutivc Off'icar, can sea that the Civil M-Zairs respo:c,.s:1.bili·f;icG of

tho various staf'i' elements are properly pla.n..'tlt?d, coo?di:1.a.teo., an:: execut.ed in

-c:.:.e

combP-.t zcme, and sine"" a.

d..i.rect support

ivil Af'fairs unit will d.ou.btless b e p2·ovid.b.g

g

he ColUlll..9.Il~er w:t.11 moclify staff organization and will assign ft~~ctio;~s t0
fi.t t~1"" I!lission and th. eirtut1s ,ancc:3 of lia opera.tio:c.o

In zituatio:-:1s wh.'..•!h

ne:ceosarily emphasize Civil _!.f:Z'a.irs ±·unctions, t·._e small uri.it l!omma.nder
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1!}.l.1-:l

create an S-5 Section, using such personnel as he r!JJ3.Y find available a:t the tilll:l.

If he is fortunate, he will receive a trained augme:o.ta.tion.

Otherwise, he way

temporarily shift staff duties to accommodate to t!1e s:l.tu.ation at hand.

:Cn

operations which are fundamentally Civil .Affairs in natu.'!'e, th- Chief of' Sta:fi'

or a. Deputy of a ls.rg~
advisor.

unit ox force may function a"'

t~e principal C:1.vil A:E';f'a.irs

In suc:'l a cs.sa the G-5 would become the lea.di:ng sJca.f:f' planner just

as G-3 does in a cOIO.ba.t situation.

The point 1.s that, in ouch a. situation, a

principal function of e,rery staff' section becon:tes support; of the Civil Affairs

I repeat - the G-5 rather than the G- 3 has

mission.

t:!i1~

lea.di:ci.g role in

operational planning in such circumstances.
An

efficient and effective mechanism :('or .liaison with U.S. and allied

diplOJ:11.a.tic agencies and l.ocal gov~rnmenta.l agencies is r:eqt1i:t·f.!d, for optimum

exet~utio:1 of Civil Affairs operations.

In operations wbic~ a.re predor:dna.tely

Civil Aff'a.irs in n.ature, as in Lebanon, the este.blismr.ent of a strong milita.ry

Its size, func't;io:11a, orga...,.iza.tion, and

civi.114~ 1iai,3on group is esoential.

procedures will vary accordiw;;; to th~ nat~e, scope, l'lle~,":!!itue:a e.na. complexity of

the Civil Affairs mission to be p~rfo:rmed.
operational plan would be prepared to
in I&banon.

111e

If time p~rtlts, a~ alter~ativ~

t the sort of cont!ri..{~e:1.c:y wh.ic1! aror.:1.-:?

SU.ch a. plan woulo. presc:dbe the size and fu:.'l.c:tiol:!s of t:'.1.r~ liaison

g;-roup.

Although many C-l'lrll M::airs duties require tec:h..'11:iea.lly tra.i!!ei speda1:Lsts.,
t he ability to db.·<:? t an.d supervise C;i. v.il Affairs ope:c"a:bio:2.s i n all situations

:i.s a. requirement for all cOl!OOJ.a.nders and ehie:f's of staff.
r.~101.i.J..d reflect t his fact.

our officer tr.s.ir..:t.:r,.g

Programs of i nstruetion of ~l!!Y and joint St!~ools

shm:'.ld develop th:i.s ability to the o.eg:t··~!= a.nd in thl:! a.spec-ts appropriate to

its eouxses and levels of inst:i:·uction.
training.

STRAC :has p:. n~ ,n'eli in t:bi s :r'ield. of'
1

I trust tha.t oux· service sch.ools a.re maki:n_g good use o! STRAG ' s i'i.t<:lr::~·

c:1:ercise-test~~ procedti.res.
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'Ille numbers and types of Civil Affairs units required for the conduct of
operations will vary according to the mission of the cor,nna.nd and the circumstances
in which it must be carried out.

The Civi~ Affairs unit reqm,rement in war will

be fairly uniform, and is reflected in the COI!tP9Sition of our mobilization troop
base, which is of course subject to mod~fication in light of the circUJ.llstances
of specific operations but which furnishes a planning guide ~t higher levels of
command,.

In operations short of war a greater Civil Affairs stre,ngth may be

inclucled in the initial troop list.
Affairs units may not be reqi;u.red>

In some non..combat situations, Civil
~owever, the Civil Af'fairs fu..~etions will

still be present and the commander wi],l look to his staff for support in band.ling
Staff officers of senior coilll11i9,nds should have, for t~eiF use in planning,

theTI.

sev~ral combinations of type Civil Affairs tµ,iits wnich would serve as guides
for planning operations under these varyipg sit~tions~
I

We all agree that corps, divisipn, and even smaller units, in any future
war must be capable of operating with substantial gaps between t~em on a

battlefield of ever-increasing width and depth.

We also agree that this war may

well be fought against an enemy capable of emplpy:J.:qg nuclear weapons of
unlimited size, CBR warfare, employing ~irborne and airla...1ded troops,
infiltrators and guerri,ila.s.

T'tlerefore~ all combat organizations must be abl~

to maintain an all-around defense and t9 establish defensive areas in great
depth9

In order for tactical units successfully to accomplish any assigned

mission under these adverse conditions, adequate Civil A:f:f'a.irs support will
be absolutely essential.

Let me assur~ you that Civil Affairs support goes

far beyond the control of refugees and the discha,rge of occupation duties.

In fact, this Civil Af'fairs su~port falls into nineteen broa~ fi~lds~
SLIDE l ON
Illustrative of this Civil Affairs suppo~t, let me comment briefly on a
few of what I consider the most im~oftant fields duri;ng combat situations:
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SLIDE 1 OFF AND SLIDE 2 ON (STRIP)
DISPLACED PERSONS - Civilians in a future~ of any ~nitude wiil su:f'ter
hardships and create problems of a ma.gp.itude never known before.
even though the Korean War was considered a luµ.te~ one,

iy

As an example,

was demonstrated

there that rei"ugees, when left unchecked, clog ma.in su~ply routes, interfere
with the movements of troops; they inter~er~ wit~

t~, eijtablishment of

defensive positions, and in addition create security risks.

Preventing sueh

situations and han.dling them if they do develop!~ not an enti~ely impossible
task it it is done by weµ integrated Civil Af,;a'j,ps uµ.its and staf'f sections,
These people a.re trained to carry out t~e co~e~·~ responsibilities under the
terms or international law or agreements for t:P,e c,ontroJ,. of re:f'\1gees and
displaced persons.

Under Ciyil Affairs ~upertj.sion, s~ch ,p ersons may be gotten

off the roads, out ot strategic areas a~d m9~t imp0rtant, where possible, out
of the zone ot responsibility ot the combat comman~r.

Let no one deeeive

himselt by brushing this off 1:1,ghtly as just anoth~r MP job.

The Military

Police can and should make a magnificent contripution especially in the torward
•

areas, but let tne:re be no mistake.

I

~if,'!

.

.

is , Civ;i.l JU'fairs job t9 be hand.led

by Civil Af"fairs people in sueh a way a~ tp free

the ~litary forees for the

military job.
LABOR - Civil Affairs units a.re ~nstrUJlle~tal in the provisio~ ot oiv;ilian
labor as requ:f,.red by ~he military -- po~&iqly th~ next most important support
role.

Building, repairing, and maintaining highwa,y, railroads and airfields

have been tremendous tasks in the, past ~d w;l.J,l be an even greater one in the
future.

So will the handling ot enormous ~pPJr.U3,ges of: ~upplies, keeping

vehieles and locomotives rolling and r~pa:f,ring qth;+ equip;i:qent.

The$e are but

a few ot the tasks that civilian l~bor can accompi~s~ for th~ oommander and
thus perl1J:it him to better utilize his o~erat~o:p.al for~es for fighti~.

At least,

he ean if he has trained Civil Affairs personnel to assis~ him in loeati~,
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obtaining, and maintaining this labor forc:e under proper a.nd uni!orm labor
policies - available to his engineers when, where and as needed.

PUBLIC SAFEfi ... Public Safety Funct;i.ons are imp.ortant to the combat
co:mma.nder .

Civil Affairs t~a.ms establish, or reestablish~ auxilia..rY civilian

police, t own patrols, circulation l imit s , a.nd curf'ews to keep order .
check~points are established.

Civilian

Proclamations and ordinances are posted to

1nf'o:rm the publi c of what is EJCpeeted of them,.

Military units will rarely

have to be diverted t o those purp,o ses when Civil Affa irs is on the job .

PUBLIC HEALTH - Public Health funct i ons go beyond those items we think
of as normally falling into this :('ield.
them.selves with measures to preserve

Civil A:f'f'airs pe,r sormel concern

or r estore the state of publie health,

thus protecting the health of' our own troops .

Due to th~ destructiveness of

. modern war, the provisions Qt the Gene~ Civilian Convention of 1949 require
belligerents to protect the civilians .

Prov·;J.sions fo:i; th~ protection of food

and water supplies must be ta.ken--and, with the added problem of tall.out, this
has become a

tremendous task .

the wounded and siek .
this?

We

must make provisions for the treat~nt ot

How will an insigniti~ant pumber of small teams aceomplish

1hey do it by the promulgation of loeal orders, directing that civilians

obs~rve neeessa:ry medical a.nd sanitation measures, and by supervising or working
with civilian public health off'ieials in the enf'oree?nent or theije ·orders and in
the pert'orma.nae ot other publio health services, thus keeping the load off ot
the military medical units .

SLIDE 2 OFF

..

One can go on and on .

Civil A:ff'a:l,rs units will assist in resto:ping

eommunications, obtaining housing for troops , locatilll!J stone quarries, sawmills,
~d building materials .

Inro:l'lna.tion ;media mu.st be alerted to keep the civilian

population informed of e1vi1 detense measures and of the policies and purpos~s
of the U. S. effort .

Tile preservation of arts, monuments, and archives; insuring

civilian supply, public transportation, and publie utilities at a IP1.nimum
essential level; in short, public well'are generally e~ot re,:nai,n a matter ot
unconcern to the military commander if he is to ~stab,li~h ~d Jl'IB.).ntai:n an
optimUlll environment for the fig~tin~ of his b~t~les~

'.lhese mo~um~~taf ~as~s

cannot be aeeomplished, however, witl,l untrained perso~el, st~f.s, ang. units.
What's more, the rest of our military orga.nii~t.:top. lilUst bee0me ~rcus,P~d to ·
working with ~d considering tl,lem.
The bati(;letield of the future a.nd its ef?.vP,o~~nt a+~ D10St diffieult to
envision and even more dif':('ieult objeet;i,,vely i;.o d~f,1~e.
and staff papers whieh have evolved ot recent y~~,

have been reached.

In ~::f,,ous EJtud,ies

~f ~ver~eµt eo~clµsions

Some would have us '.Jilif,rtw.e 1;11.~ t'ut:ure Q~ti;;tet'~eld with an

administrative support b~.~e e.nd a wide ~p~sl!
of llPltF:rl~d. 1;>etwe~n1 that ba.s e
1
and t he eonit,>~t elements.

Ot~ers would lw,v~

~~

~~~~:ure it as a ~4 witn

f ingers--lines ot eommunication--stretohing off ~h,v~

t~~

hi~ter~a.nd with

the tips of the finge~s in ~ontaet with the ene,py.
No one has suggested that the future battlefiel~ wili be tµa.t ~a+row zone
between belligerents in whie~ the fi~h~i~ of p;i.s~

WJJW$ ~~

l~n p~aqe.

I n reality, no one rea.Uy knows what thl;I,~ fµt)lJ;', ba:~tlef;Lel.q. w:lll 'be like,

and tor the pu;rpose of our discussion today, i~ iij

9t no great importance.

Because, irrespective of the sbape of that b~ttlefieid, t~~re w~ll 9e ~ore
civilians on it, more destruction, more dep1~~nce

9y thope ~ivi~i~s o~ the

military and for that matte~, more de;pend.e,p.oe 'bf tbe ~.}r;i:tary on the ~ivili!µl
t han bas ev~r been true before.
Tb.is all adds up to the tact that the eo~~e,r
,

I

~~

~he

1ie+4, who is held
,

r e sponsibl~ tor the conduct ot the battie, m~pt 13r+so be ~~s~pn~i~le tor Civil
A!'tairs operations.
I have outlined for you som,e ot the f'4Il~tious of Civi~ Att~irs.
question is--how will these function~ be impl~me~~edf
7

'lhe

In looking to the future as it may pe a,ftect,d

py

1:lle gre13,t unknown,

nuclear warfare, t he f'unetion ot the Civil ~ffai~~ s~aff otf'ieer ( t he ,Assistant
Chief of Sta.tt, q-5) and the mission of the Civil ,Attau:~ .wait pro~:a.bl y w+i l
remain subst{l.Iltially unchanged.

The~r prQb+e~, P,QW~er, will 't;>e magnified in

proportion to the intensity of the n~c+ear ex~h.a.m$e.
The new element introduce(}., however, ;i.i:;1 the

V~$'1ii

I

l ikely to be attected.

~-,r JPt h ~

9~:l.ngs

This eleme:r;it, in itself, wi,.U de~.d ~,h~ ,deye.;l.opm,nt

and t raini:p.g of the most et:ficient ~v~J. At:i;'a.;L;r,f;I o,rg~jzatJ. .AA :i.lb;i,;l;l q~ pe

devised.

Here, I wouJ.d like to poin;t; ol,lt 't~t Jll()+'' ~}'l® ,tl}..e dev~lo]?me:g.t and

training of Civil Affairs un~ts is ~eeess~y.
staff members at all ech~loµs of

c~~

~ere~~ a need for Civil Ai"tairs

~9 1~~91", o~~;i.mµJ,n em~ioyme~t of such

units and in their absence to assi$t th~ co~~de~ to in~ure t}l,at

a~q~~t~

attention is paid to that muJ.titude or O~vi~ ,Atf~irs l1lf4.t,t~s v~tp~ wi.J,l
either impede or f acilitate his operatio~s, i~ it~ect proppr~io~ ~o the ~f fort
expe:nded v.pon them.

Who is to say what wo'l\Ld, ~ve ¥p~eµei;I. d.p. ~ssia in WOll'l<\

War I I had the Germans observed prol'<'r Ci~il Mt~ir~
campaigns, in the UKRAINE?

~rt~oip~~P

~tining their

It is impo~tant, to9, tlµi~ othe~ ~t~tt ~~rsq;qnel

become familiar with this Civil Affairs ~t~t' tµn,t,:t.op. ~d

p, a,,ycn1st01µed

to

dealing with a G-5 sta.tf element on sue~ probl~ms.
Some of the proposed means for meettng thie fequ1rement are:
a.

To

include G-5 staff .seetio~~ an4 ~ J?rope;r +Bil?;lo q'f O:l,vil J.±, a~rs

units i n all force struct~es.

b.

To

give due consideration to C~vi; Af'~A~~~ ~ap~bilitie~ in the

preparation of a.11 contingency planij~ ~o ;Lt1.1=1ure 'tbaj; ~p.es~ pl~s ma,k;e adeq~te
pr ovision for Civil Atfa;i.rs suppo~i.

Affairs principles.
d.

To insure tha:ti the operati~ ~tUJ:1~ of t;:j,.vj,,t 4tta;tr~, ??-pt just

the adm:imstrative or military govern,m~~t ]?ha.~,~ is ~~;lerte~ tp.roughput

military doctrine.
e.

To maintain a elose working relationship betwee~ the Department

of Defense and the other governmental ~en~ies coµcerned with our national
policy.
Now, what are sane other new developments
with whieh we should be familiar?

ot

importance to Civil Mfairs

One develo~nt; has to do "'1th serious re

examination of Civil At:rairs doctrine,

The De~tl)lent o'!

th~ 4,:Tp.y, USCONARC,

and the service schools are constantly revie1;ing doetripe a.nq. ~earel:J.ipg tor
ways to improve it and the techniques invqlved in C!vi~ Aff~!rs -0perations.
Doctrine and techniques of operation must fit thf p~w con9epts 9f hpt war a~d,
equally iµlportant, the current concept of ~~ace.

I should also like to invite your attent;toA to a stuw in ~rogi,~ss whie~
should help us to place the f"uture in :i;>erspeej;;1,v.e

ot operation and doctrine.

The

a,s

we r~t:j.n~

qtµ'

study i~ ope undeh ~on~r~et wit4

Research Office (ORO) of' Johns Hopkins qntve~sity.

t~~

Operations

It ~s 9~e~ Ul'lder preparatio~

for three years and is entitled "Opt:l.;n:i~ PAMG O:r~aAAza.t;l.on

196o" (u). This study considers ~he Civil At'fai;t-e

techniques

a,ni.

Functionipg after,

a.sper;ts of cold as vell as

hot war •
. Another development has to do with the r,ole o+ C;i.vil fif!a:i,rs ~n m~eting the
threats o! Communist subversion in unq.e;r-t;lev~pe<l, fpiendly ~ountries.

'!be cold

war is presenting Civil Att'ai+'s with n~ challeJ:ige~, J10t oJ'l'.).y in $out4east Asia.
but in this he~sphere as well.

~e e~~tsts ~eli~ve tba,~ ~he ~der-develop~~,
I

'

have-not, countries represent the Achill~s hee~ 0!
'):he

,~~ fi'r~e

most dangerous form o! Connnunist agr~~ij~cn in t~e

Wonlq.

PP~~

War ~s a Fift~

Column constituted internally as a ioeal Co~i~t P®"~Y Pr ~fe~na+J,y
nationals who make up the nucleus of tpe Pt:1,rtf to oe ~onneq
occasion arises.

'lllis organization ts the~~·

the people.
9

~~

PY

~sed when the

'll1,e i:18.l:'get of thia enemy ~s

They are the real stakes in the cold war.

Al,though Southeast Asia has only

.S~

per cent 01" the world's total area, it has 66o million peop,1.e, abol.lt 9Il~-fourtb
01" the world's population.
A

cold-war operational doctrine has evolve~ ~ng thep~ s ~ ~tiq~s wh1,~A
'

o1"1"ers considerable prospect of success.

Tb.is doctrine is based ~pop the use

01" the nations' armed 1"orces as a civic sup:i;>ort ageney.

Sometimes the m;µ1tary

forms the only dynamic and cohesive 1"oree tor preservµ:i.g sovereignty in a
country and is the most stable eleme~t 01" the govenuzient.

Its ;units are

stationed throut;hout the country with u,n~forms tb,at el~arly id.en:titl its ~emb.,1;121
as government people.

The military COlllJ?l.~ieation net may be the only rea.µy

e1"1"ieient communications system in ~he eowtry.

'!'he 4,rmed Forees ~y ~e the

only agency upon which the government ean plAce 1"u.l1 relia.n.ee.

lb.us, the

national sovereign ot necessity turns to the arJ!led t'o!t'ees 1"or ne:t;:f,qnc\l duties
tar beyond the traditional role of the milit~I'

!neir lIJS.in PllJ:'llO~e

~~~.).~

with army-people relationship tor winntp.g the!~ support ot the ep',1Pt;ry-si4,
for the armed forces and thus tor the ~overnment.

Civil A:t."!airs activities

become a primary weapon in this war to convince the people that their ul.timat~
salvation lies with the non-communist world.
One method employed in Southeast Asia tor :t.mproving the civilian-military
relations tor which we have great hol?e is what we call ncivie Action." Civic
Action is a project 01" a selt'~help ~ture tmdertaken by arJ]led to~ces, 1~
conjtmction with the local. popul.ation, for the benetit and weµ-be+ne; qt
civilians or civilian colD!ll.u.nities, generally in 1"ields

of p~lio wella.IT~,

public works, public health, educ~t~q~, ,m4 ot~e~ sue~ l;U'eas ~f QiVtlia.µ eQn~e~A•

A number ot countries where we have Military As~ist1;µ1ce Advts9~y Groµi~ a.+e
conducting some activities in the civic action f~eid.

TM,.s to~ovs clpsely

suggestions made by the Draper Committee which recently com~let~d
survey 01" our military aid program.
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~

exhaustive

A new DOD Directive states:

nMilitary assistance programs should, where

:f'ea.sible, encourage the use of indigenous military and para-military forces
in under-developed countries in the construction o! public works a.nd other

activities helptu.1 to eeono:mie development, provided th.at such participation.
does not significantly d.etraet from the capability ot the :f'orees to per:f'orm
essential milita.ry missions. 11
Mueh needs to be accomplished to integrate a.:n. e~tective Civil M:f'atrs

operation into the t otal indigenous military ef'tort.
Mtairs capability is required.

An indigenous

Th.e developmentot this ea.pabi]..ity

Civil

ts

:f'acilitated by Civil .At:f'a.irs advisors in the MAAG; by U.S • .Axmy Mobile Civil
Mf'a.irs traini11g teams an~ by ottering training for :f'oreig~ otf'ieera at t)le
U.S. Army Civll Affairs School.

The development o:f' Civil A..~airs tecbni~ues in the Cold War is a two-way
street.
We are learning much ~rom the Southeast Asia..~ otticers.

Their ~dea.s on

the role Civil Atrairs plays in their national security a~e realistieally
based upon ne~essity.

It hs.1.:t of the United States wer~ occupied by the enell!V

and the people in the re:!lla.ini ~g halt' were not tully coI!t'i&~nt of tAe ability

ot our governme.2.t, we wouJ.d be j·ast a.s reaJ.istic.

'1!a.e U.S• .Arm:y Civil At'tairs

School presently teaches the e'...eir-:lopment of a good 'basic Civil Mtairs
eapabili ty which is moat

"UZG:.'\!J.l

in operations in a. hot war.

mission o~ the sehool when or~ilmlly established.

'.f.1-,..is was the

Within this lim;tt some

recognition is given to the Cold War aspects of Civil Attairs.
this is not sutficient to

~~t

~owever,

the increasi ng requirements to train tore!~

ottieers and the MAAG adv!so~s t or the areas where the war is being pre~sed
by

our Communist enemy.

Tb. e d.eil!la.!ld is not limited to Southeast Asi~.
1

America. is an area of similar concern.

Our

courses at the School

~'llS~

South

'tl~

rev;i.sed to meet this reqci.reme:ut or a new course must be developed !or the
purpose.
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A third and last development which I shoul.d like to discuss today, altho~h
by no means the least, bas to do with Civil Defense.

Recently General Lemnitzer, Chairman ot the Joint Chiets ot Statt, indieat~d
that "!ast moving events ot current history are bringing into clear to~~.fil the
inter-relationship between civil defense and military strength--both ot which
are essential elements ot our national security posture."

He turther indicate~

that the Arm::! is ready and able, not only to assist in civil detense should
that become ne¢esaa.ry, but to plan now concerning the tor.m s~ch assistance should
take.

He believes that the benef':i.ts would be vs.st in proportion to tne am.cunt ot

time, ettort and e..~pense involved in the planning.

It

lllllSt

also be remembered,

that only the absence ot a military mission, together with the pres~nce ot an
important and pressing civil defense objective, juptities diverting military
units !rom their combatant rolco

Therefore, it is impossible ~o earmark m1litary

units tor a specific civil defense role.

Major e1em.ents ot the military W?-,~l

always be re4uired tor purely m.ilita.ry operations.

While civil defe~se B.Ad

military defense a.re inseparably linked, eivil de:tense must, nevertheJ.ess, remat~
primarily a civilian responsibility.
However, t h e ~ is respo~sible for eoordL'1B.ting both the planning fo~

a~~

the rendering of :milita.ry support by all o'! the s~.r vic~s in civ,il det'enise
emergencies.

CON.ARC ha.a been given this mission through9ut the ZI.

Cl,ose co

ordination is e!tected with civ"i.l defense authorities at National, regional,
State, a:nd local levels in planning tor support ot civil detense emer~ener
operations.

Tb.us, the military c:a.n minimize post-attack diversion qt ;mili~

resources tor emergency assistance to civil authorities by ~elping these ~ut~o~itien
to increase civil defense readiness.

General Lemnitzer bas said that the A:J:rmy

will assist in ettorts to improve civil detense prepa.r~dness ~uring t4e pre-

attack period to the extent p~r:mitted by budgetary and other +~•ouree _

limitations and the requirement to maintain its army's combat reaQ.in~se.
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In briet, military assistance in civil defense eme~gencies sha.11 be
rendered when sueh assistance is r~quested or directed in aceorda.nce with
appropriate Public laws and Executive Orders.

or

'!he active and reserve componeµ,t~

the services will be prepared to support the maintenance ot a:o.d.jor the r~

establisbment ot law and order in areas critical to national survival, in the
event civil control or leadership is destroyed or overwhel.-m.ed.

Military

assists.nee a:ndjor control will be withdrawn when civil control is re-estaoitshe~.
Our

reserve Civil A:C'tairs units can assist the ZI Armies in this civil

defense role.

They a.re fashioned to t'Unetion a.mid civilians in the crisis,

eon:t'usion and danger ot eombat and are, therefore, ideall.y suited tor sueh a
mission.

They a.re organized to o!ter assistance and advice in the eonduet of

the essentiaJ. gover:mnental tunetions at all levels

or

govermnent.

They are

trained to cope with m:il.ita.ry-civilia.n relationships under the most extreme
circumsta.nees.

In tact, during eonibat operations part o~ their responsibility

entails the aetual advice or supervision, where required, ot local ~iv:U dete~~,.
Tb.e pertinent question tor us is--what is the task o~ Civil Mtairs and
particul.a.rl.y the Civil At'ta.irs Resel"Ve units in the D'l..i11'Gary role in our
domestic CiviJ.

Da:f'ei1se?

I belieYe we b.a;'t'e the answer.

It is the same sort

ot Civil Affairs support that we envisage tor 1-Jl!'..its in e01llbat.

'.lhe Reserve

Civil Mtairs units can provi~~ valuable assist~nee to eomm.anders--partieul.ar,ly
in the prepa.ra;tion o'!: plans tor military assista.'.l'lce i:n. th~ pre-attaek phase.
As you know this type ot a$eista.nce is being rendered ~.J.rea~ in some a:rm:;,
areas.

Civil A:r:fairs units in the Seeond. Army Area have been assigned. planµ:f,ng

missions covering some thirteen. target complexes.
same proee&l.lre.

First Ar1r>.y is tollowing 1::~

I feel that we ahould make tull use ot the not inconsiderable

talents o-r our Civil A:f'tairs units in all co:ntinentaJ. a:rm:y areas.

Thi~ sort Qt

utilization provides exeellent and purpos~ful training for the Civil Attair~
u.~its as well as valuable assistanes to the ZI A:;i:'l.rzy' e~nde~s.
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It is not necessary to dwell on the assista:."1.ee Civil Aftairs units can
render if' eaJ.led upon in the wake ot a thermonuclear attack on the United State~ • .

It is clea.r that, in the i~itial. phases, our na.tio,:,a,1 recovery et:fort ot
necessity would be decentral.ized.

Any local

omma.nd~r required to assist in

the recovery o~ his neighboring co.nmunity woul.d hand.le his vital responsibility
tor the milita:ry-~ivilian relations more cXfectively and more rapidly if he co\l'.J,d
employ a trained Civil Affairs u-:iit to assist him.

Should the commander be

f'aeed with the temporary assumption of civilian eoiutrol in the absence o! lo~a;L

authority he would have an even g:reater 1 need. tor such a. wait.

Tb.us, reserve

Civil A.f'fairs units should be required to pertorm a two-told mission in support

ot civil de~ens~ oparations; pre-pls.!L.~ing to imp:ro~e readiness to weathef a.~
atomic attack, a..vad :post~attaek operations.

Reallstie pre-attack plamling

a.p.q.

well-eoncei
ved. post~a.ttack tra.i:ui:ng will eontribute di:i:·ectly to National
;
Security.

It will also eon:trib-u.te by im.provirig nation.al. co:n.fidenee.

derived. trom the k:-.iowledge that the
Con:.f'idence in the ability

o'f

.krmy is ready.11 able a,n.d wil~i.ng

Cont'ide~~e
to h~lp.

t::us netion to· su:rviv-~ and prevail even again.st~

thermonuclear d.isaste~o

In the atomic world Civil At'fe.irs a,eisurues a critical. role

To reeapitul.ate.

in military operations.

With the broadening 8.li'.ti de,:ipani!lg of the battle zone

to include whol® nations m.i.lita.!'y~e::ivil matters have become more ..::omplex and

greater

in magnitua.e

tha:J. ar:.y e:..'q;)e:t·iene~d. b~reto:rort?.

Tht'Jir pla.n.ini:ng.11 direetiR~,

and ~oordination demands a state ot reaQ'dn~ss, a capability to rea.t without
pa.raJ.lel. in history o

This eonru.·Gion of readineH:!16 d.e:mB.ll!ds a Civil Att'airs

capabil1 ty extending from the :t1.ationaJ. level through ea.ch t:OOllIJBJ!td eehelo:0- do~ t .o

the Battle Group.

Civil Atll."ai.rs is au i·,. esc:apa.ble a:'.:d in.iereasingly impo:rtant

f'unction of comma.r.d tba.t requires ctlr~etion, eoordi:natio~ and control at the
General Stat't' le,rel.

A year or so ago, based on General Bruce Clarke's reeomme~~tion, the ter'JII.
"Military Government" was dropped tro:m the title ot this tunetipn.
measure ot prime importance.

This was a,

It is a long step towards correcting the !allaeioue

and dangerous thinking which erroneously designates Civii .Affairs as an
accompaniment solely of the occupation of conquered territory.
gentlemen; let us move with it; let us once and tor all dispel

Time moves on,

t:tw concept

tll,a.t

Civil Affairs operations commence after eont'liet has ended; let us eliminate ~hf;t
reactionary thinking that blinds many ot our people to the major contribution
that Civil Affairs can and must :make to our suee~ss in war, hot or cold.

We im+st

instill the doctrine that commanders require a General St~t toeal point !Qr
coordinating all matters of the military-civilian relationship.

1£:t us reflect

well on the tact that the A:rm:y is the executive agency to~ the J)epart~ent of
Defense in Civil Aftairs.
'lbe Army canno~ withdraw into its training shell, eo~qerned only with
developing weapons and tactical readiness for its next battlefield.
more to war than. hardware a.nd tactics.

'!here is

War is a struggle for co:o.trol ot peoplef
111

-

Other services primarily eonduct their operations in the air a.n,d on. SJ2d under
.
sea.

The Army operates on the land and among the people.

th~

This is the army'$.

environment, which it must :m...~ster as completely as the sailor niasters these~
and the flyer the air.
Civil Affairs is moving ahead on ma~l fronts.
concepts.

Trends clepa.rt fro~ tra<li~i~~

Commanders and sta.tt officers ot the future must have an open mind.,

They must have vision, imagination, and daring.

adju$t to the challenge.

They must meet the c~e al'.l,!i

They must master their enviropm.ent.

you, as future commanders and staff officers, will do.
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!J.'h.is, I believe

SLIDE 1

CIVIL AFFAIRS P'UNC'r.CONS

l - LEGAL
2 -

PUBLIC SAFETY

3 - PUBLIC HEALTH
4 - PUBLIC WELFARE

5 - PUBLIC FINANCE
6 - PUBLIC EDUCATION

7 - LABOR
8 - ECONOMICS

9 - COMMERCE & INDUSTRX

lO - FOOD

&

AGRICUL'iURE

11 - PRICE CONTROL & RA'f.IONING

12 - PROPERTY CONTROL

13 - CIVILIAN SUPPL".(

14 - PUBLIC WORKS

&

UTIL:C'l'IES

15 - PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS

16 - PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
17 - CIVIL INFORMATION
18 - DISPLACED PERSONS
19 - ARTS, MONUMENTS

&

ARCHIVES

SLIDE 2

I}Il?OR~'l'I CI;VJ;L .A,FAIRS FIJ)}LDS
'

l - DISPLA,CED PERSONS
2 - LABOR

3 - PUBLIC SAFETY
4 - POBLJ;C HE.ALT!!

'

